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ABSTRACT. Michel Foucault’s Punitive Society lectures make clear that, for him, punishment 
presents a critical problem. On the one hand, Foucault struggles to develop a conceptual 
vocabulary adequate to punishment, and particularly to the prison-form as a penal development. 
On the other hand, the Punitive Society lectures clearly indicate the stakes of punishment. How, 
Foucault asks, might punishment focalize relations of power? How might it serve as a field of 
struggle? What does a punitive technology of power look like, if it exists? Indeed, across 
numerous works from the 1970s and 1980s, Foucault traces the varying place of penalties within 
penal and punitive tactics, showing how punishment reciprocates historical relations of power 
and problems of power. Yet it remains necessary to develop Foucault’s account of punishment, 
which is never formalized. In this paper, I develop punishment as a polyvalent technology. 
Foucauldian punishment may be an analytic, a technology, and—in the allegorical “punitive 
city” from Discipline and Punish—a diagram of power. I argue that Foucauldian punitive power 
seizes the body in the name of an authority or a reified power to subordinate individuals to that 
authority, and with an objective to correct the individual’s relation to a multiplicity. It operates 
“above,” at the level of, and in “fragments” of embodied individuals. Further, with Foucault’s 
account of the “punitive city,” we find a theoretical model in which punishment becomes the 
ordering force of the social, and therein a diagram of punitive power exerted in extensive form 
across the social field. 
Keywords: diagram, Foucault, punishment, punitive city, punitive power, technology of 
INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTIONS OF PUNITIVE POWER 
Nearly three decades ago, the celebrated sociologist David Garland wrote that Michel 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish “offers not so much a theory of punishment as a mode of 
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theorizing about punishment.”1 Garland recognized Foucault’s method, in which 
punishment cannot be extricated from the social systems and exterior relations that 
invest it with power. But Garland found this approach lacking: Foucault, he said, gave 
no integrated idea of the purpose and use of punishing; no accounting for who is and 
who should be penalized, for what offenses, by what authority; no thought to the 
expressive role of punishment; and no reckoning with how penality and punishment fail 
their objectives.2 Foucault’s then-available oeuvre was significantly narrower than the 
wealth of materials present today. Accordingly, some critiques by Garland and his 
contemporaries hold less weight in light of the passing years. 3 Even so, Garland’s view 
that in Foucault, “punishment is exclusively a utilitarian means of control”4 betrays a 
critical but unacknowledged divergence. For Foucault, punishment emerges as a prism 
and an “analyser of power relations,”5 as a technology of power, and as a field of 
struggle. By contrast with Garland, punishment is not a mechanism deployed to 
“utilitarian” ends, as if it were an object within society, nor a soldier’s weapon, but most 
often a “force exercised on other forces.”6  
Foucault used the terms “punishment” and “punitive power” expansively in the 
periods preceding and following the publication of Discipline and Punish in 1975. 7 The 
recent release of his Punitive Society lectures, along with the publication of Foucault’s 
complete Collège de France courses, offers an important opportunity to augment 
understandings of punishment within and without Foucault’s thought. The Punitive 
Society lectures obviate many of Garland’s critiques, particularly those concerning the 
ends, normativity, and “strategic use” of punishment when it departs from its 
foundational rationale. However, Foucault introduces a tense and tenuous overlap of 
punitive and disciplinary technologies in the lectures. At the outset, Foucault makes a 
series of distinctions, such as a contrast between “the punitive regime of crimes and the 
disciplinary regime of labor.”8 As the lectures continue, Foucault increasingly 
                                                 
1 David Garland, “Frameworks of Inquiry in the Sociology of Punishment,” The British Journal of Sociology 
41:1 (1990), 4. 
2 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (1990); Garland, “Frameworks of 
Inquiry.”  
3 For example, Garland says that as readers of Discipline & Punish “we are asked to [simply] accept that the 
creation of a criminal class became a deliberate feature in a political strategy" in his Punishment and Modern 
Society, 160. Levelled today, after the publication of the Collège de France lectures and especially The Punitive 
Society’s discussion of the criminal as “social enemy,” the same critique would be less worrisome.  
4 “Frameworks of Inquiry,” 7; italics in original. 
5 Michel Foucault, The Punitive Society: Lectures at the College de France 1972-1973 (2015), 12. 
6 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (1999), 30. 
7 Chronologically, the subsequent works that treat punishment include The Punitive Society; Michel 
Foucault, “Truth and Juridical Forms” [1973] in Power. Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. 3, 
ed. James D. Faubion (2000); Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973-74 
(2006); Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France 1974–1975 (2003); Michel Foucault, 
Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison [1975] (1979); Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at 
the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (2008); and Michel Foucault, Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of 
Avowal in Justice [1981] (2014).  
8 Punitive Society, 72. 
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superimposes disciplinary forms over forms of punishment,9 and by the lectures’ 
conclusion, Foucault twice reads the punitive and the disciplinary together, including 
the remark—from Foucault’s notes, rather than the spoken transcript—regarding “the 
analysis of a form of power I have called punitive, which it would be better to call 
disciplinary.”10 Yet Foucault does not stick with a progressive account, instead returning 
to implicit distinctions between the punitive and the disciplinary, between punishment 
and discipline, in subsequent works. Simultaneously, the Punitive Society lectures 
establish that the exchange between punishment and penality is contingent and 
unstable. For Foucault, punitive power represents a coercive correction that operates as 
a social force rather than power crystallized in institutional form. Penality operates 
orthogonally to punishment, as a system of mandated penalties and sanctions but which 
is neither exhausted by nor exhausts the punitive. The punitive-penal distinction opens 
questions, both historical and abstract, of their coincidence as relays of power. 
The Punitive Society lectures also help to make sense of Discipline and Punish’s peculiar 
claim that sovereignty, disciplinarity, and the “punitive city” present “three 
technologies of power” by which the social may be organized.11 While sovereignty and 
discipline are broadly familiar, the less familiar “punitive-city” conceit is Foucault’s 
abstraction of 18th century proposals to maintain social order through public 
punishment. In the punitive city, public and publicized penalties — “at the crossroads, 
in the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges built”12—correct offenders 
and keep the potentially unruly in line; they send messages about what and who are to 
be punished; and they remind subjects of the political order in which they live. As a 
technology of power, sovereignty coerces obedience to the sovereign will via “non-
isotopic” series of hierarchical relations, for example from king to seigneur to vassal and 
peasant.13 Disciplinary power creates docile subjects by habituating bodies and their 
forces in institutions. Analogously, the punitive city uses public punishments to 
guarantee a social order by exploiting representations, such that power passes across 
multiplicities, individuals, and individuals’ “somatic fragments.”14 However, the 
“punitive city” is but one use of punishment—and a technology that never took root to 
the extent of sovereignty and disciplinarity.  
From the point of departure of technologies of power, this paper offers a minimal 
account of punishment and punitive power. I argue that Foucauldian punitive power 
operates when authority seizes the body; the imposed penalty targets the relations 
between the individual and the multiplicity, as well as “somatic fragments” and the 
individual; and the act of punishment imbues a causal story that differentiates the 
                                                 
9 For example, in the historical filiation of the prison through lettres de cachet in Punitive Society, 139–40; and 
in the worker’s livret or work-log in Punitive Society, 193–194. 
10 Punitive Society, 237n. 
11 Foucault, Discipline & Punish, 130. 
12 Discipline & Punish, 113. 
13 On this reading of sovereignty, see Foucault, Psychiatric Power, 42-45; and Michel Foucault, Security, 
Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78 (2009), 11–12 and 65.  
14 Psychiatric Power, 44. 
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offender and any associated collectivities. The following section rehearses Foucault’s 
archaeology of punishment, dwelling on the punitive theories of criminology’s “great 
reformers” that resonate with contemporary problems of penality and state punishment. 
The third section considers Foucault’s analysis of punishment as an operation “above,” 
at the level of, and in “fragments” of embodied individuals. Consequently, punishment 
presents a field of struggle or fields of struggle. The fourth section turns to the “punitive 
city,” which I read both as a theoretical culmination of the 18th century penal reformers’ 
project, as well as a diagram of coercive deterrence. Here I depart from Foucault, and 
argue that his dichotomous choice of “punitive city or coercive institution” was 
misconceived because the functions of one may be used inside or alongside the other. By 
way of conclusion, I offer a speculation on the relations of disciplinary and punitive 
power in which the two might operate in conjunction rather than convergently or 
complementarily. 
My principal reading method in this paper is to “read Foucault with Foucault,” 
privileging points of convergence across Foucault’s various treatments of punishment 
and punitive power. Contemporary encounters with Foucault’s thought must span a 
variety of materials and genres, including books, lecture series, one-off talks, academic 
interviews, journalistic interviews, and editorials. Foucauldian scholarship offers 
various interpretivist strategies,15 including periodization accounts of the 
“archaeological phase,” “genealogical phase,” and “ethical turn”; periodization by 
published work, where lectures such as The Punitive Society and Abnormal prefigure texts 
such as Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, Volume 1, respectively; and fledging 
Foucault’s materials as projects independent from his published books and essays, with 
each text the momentary capture of a slowly morphing set of projects and intellectual 
interests. In this paper, I fall into the last of these, looking to the ways that one text 
might inform another while allowing that the texts may contain contradictions both 
internally and in juxtaposition with one another. 
NOTES TOWARD A PUNITIVE ARCHAEOLOGY 
By beginning his analyses of punishment with classical antiquity, Foucault immediately 
troubles any congruence between punishment and institutional or state penality. In the 
eras prior to the emergence of the state,16 violators of the social order might well be 
“punished”17; but these punishments were quite dissimilar to the punishments that 
would emerge in sovereign penality. In Foucault’s examples of the classical Greek 
system, the medieval German system, and pre-capitalist feudalism, punishment 
                                                 
15 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1983); Eric 
Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge (2006); Henry Martyn Lloyd, “Power, Resistance, and the 
Foucauldian Technologies” Philosophy Today 56:1 (2012), 26–38; Patrick Gamez, “Did Foucault Do Ethics? 
The ‘Ethical Turn,’ Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Truth” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy – 
Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française XXVI:1 (2018), 107-133.  
16 Foucault dates this to the end of the sixteenth century in Security, Territory, Population, 165. 
17 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 18. 
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responds to interruptions of the social order. All three repaired violations of the social 
order by appeals to force: the prevailing party in a dispute would be the party who 
could call upon greater violence, physical strength, glory, or status.18 In the juridical 
apparatus of classical Greece, as Foucault describes it, claims presented in legal 
testimony were mediated by the speaker’s social status—claims which might concern 
events in question or the claimants’ authority. The magistrate or judge recorded the 
proceedings, arbitrated the status of the litigants, and made points of order. Foucault’s 
interest lies in juridical procedure as part of a project to historicize truth and the 
production of truth: how Greeks determined who is legally right and what penalties 
apply for the one who is legally wrong. 19 In a context where the “demonstration of truth 
becomes a political task,”20 the court acted as arbitrator of a social order that was never 
completely static and enrolled the penalty as a consequence for a legal wrong.  
Medieval German society settled disputes more actively, through an ongoing and 
private “war between individuals” where each violation that one suffered could be 
rectified by retribution on the party that caused it. The Germanic judicial apparatus 
intervened not to mandate a return to order, but to offer a venue for either a “regulated 
way of making war” or a brokered settlement.21 Penalties were payments, but also 
methods of equilibrating the balances of social forces. In this sense, the court served as 
both the scene of and the field for struggles over the social order. The court has a similar 
place in Foucault’s exposition of feudal dispute resolution, centered around the test: “the 
test did not serve to name, to identify the one who had told the truth; rather, it 
established that the stronger individual was, at the same time, the one who was right.”22 
The feudal test—from verbal formulas for oaths, to physical tests, to physical combats—
did not establish the right social order so much as it allowed that order to be manifested. 
Where punishment appeared, it appeared in the form of the stronger party wishing to 
level its force on the weaker, rather than from the institutions of adjudication.  
European monarchies reconfigured the place of jurisprudence and punishment as 
they accumulated and centralized the means of force, beginning in the twelfth century 
and then again during the late medieval period. Institutional punishment arose here, 
with an epistemic shift. The monarchy took on the role of creating and maintaining 
order, no longer content to be the most powerful force among forces. This shift entailed 
that offenses created both concrete victims who had been cheated, robbed, assaulted and 
so on, as well as an abstract victim: the sovereign who was “injured by the mere fact that 
                                                 
18 While all used institutional or sovereign punishment at times, it was not a major strategy; regarding 
Greek punishment, see Punitive Society, 10; regarding medieval German punishment, see “Truth and 
Juridical Forms,” 35; finally, Foucault gives several examples of punishment under feudalism, such as 
during the Nu-pieds rebellion, in the notes to his 1 December 1971 lecture of Théories et institutions pénales: 
Cours au Collège de France (1971-1972) (2015). 
19 See the April 22, 1981 lecture in Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling. 
20 This phrasing comes from Michel Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Collège de France 
(1970-1971) (2009), 183. 
21 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 34ff. 
22 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 39. 
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an offense or a crime had occurred” within “his” purview.23 If the sovereign could be 
injured by violations of “his” order, then “his” response would necessitate the full right 
of “his” power: the sovereign righteousness to punish, the sovereign privilege to do 
violence, and the sovereign interest in its control over the social multiplicity. The famous 
execution of Robert-François Damiens, with which Foucault opens Discipline and Punish, 
epitomizes the sovereign restoration. It was not enough simply to imprison nor to 
execute Damiens, who had attacked the king with a penknife and presented little real, 
political threat. Rather, in a demonstration of the full power of Louis XV, Damiens was 
tortured, pierced with red-hot pokers, drawn and quartered, and finally burned at the 
stake. Foucault emphasizes across works that the sovereign responds to violations of 
“his” authority by pitting “his” power against the individual’s and demonstrating the 
excess of violence that the sovereign wields over the individual.24 What Foucault terms 
the “penal ensemble”—which is to say, penality—originates in this “practice of justice 
organized by reference to the exercise of sovereign political power.”25 
However, monarchical penality was practically constrained by the friction of 
multiplied relays. The growth of the administrative and tax-collection apparatus by the 
French monarchy—Foucault’s major example—extended its legal reach and extractivist 
capacities but also legitimated nobiliary privilege in the regional parlements.26 Most 
sentences were mandated by the king’s laws but adjudicated and carried out by a local 
elite emplaced in a way that the king and king’s agents were not. At times there was 
deep judiciary resistance to carrying out mandated sanctions, including the refusal by 
individual judges to enforce laws and whole parlements to register certain edicts.27 The 
non-elite classes also engaged in popular refusals of unjust laws and sentences—at times 
without disputing any underlying truth to the charge—to force a sort of negotiation 
with the juridical authority or appropriate juridical power through spontaneous 
sedition.28 The abstract victim had aggravated sovereign power’s vulnerability and 
multiplied the sites where it might be resisted. If the sovereign could be harmed in the 
market plaza and in the storeroom in addition to the field of battle—through petty theft 
and tax evasion, and beyond interpersonal violence—then the means for subverting and 
diverting the sovereign will were multiplied to an equal extent. Thus, if Frédéric Gros is 
correct that in this period “social equilibrium depends on alliances and tacit agreements 
between certain classes to bypass laws,”29 then such “illegalisms” present a constant 
counterforce to monarchical use of sovereign power.  
                                                 
23 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 42. 
24 e.g. Foucault, Abnormal, 82ff.; Discipline & Punish, 47ff.; Punitive Society, 33–34. 
25 Punitive Society, 111. 
26 This point appears in consolidated form in the notes for the 1st of December 1971 lecture of Théories et 
institutions pénales; additionally, Foucault’s extended treatment of Boulainvilliers in “Society Must Be 
Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76 (2003) hinges on the nobiliary struggle for their place in 
the late French monarchy’s distribution of the relays of sovereign power. 
27 24 November 1971 lecture notes, Théories et institutions pénales. 
28 Discipline & Punish, 59ff.; 21 February 1973 and 28 February 1973 lectures, Punitive Society. 
29 Frédéric Gros, “Is There a Biopolitical Subject? Foucault and the Birth of Biopolitics,” in Biopower: Foucault 
and Beyond, ed. Vernon Cisney and Nicolae Morar, trans. Samantha Bankston (2016), 262. 
MARIO BRUZZONE 
Foucault Studies, No. 26, 64-90   70  
In the late 1700s a juridical movement emerged in opposition to the instabilities and 
unreliability of absolute sovereign power. The “‘great reformers’” of the movement—
Beccaria, Brissot, Servin, and others to whom Foucault returns across his works—took 
sovereignty’s “bad economy of power” as their problem.30 Their historical moment was 
marked by four features. First, violations of the social order were shifting toward 
property crimes and away from regulatory and violent crimes, largely with the growth 
in capitalist relations. Second, prior to the emergence of the reformers, the law had 
increasingly indicated for severe sanctions for minor offenses, which, third, had been 
applied with increasing irregularity. Fourth, the reformers largely believed crime to be 
increasing—despite, Foucault tells us, contemporary empirical evidence to the 
contrary.31 The social order, the reformers reasoned, was breaking down, and in their 
proposals they responded with a series of substitutions and exchanges. Two are 
especially pertinent to this article. The first exchanged abstract victims of crime. Where 
the abstract victim had been the sovereign, with the reformers it is “society.” In their 
theory, criminal violations present an “attack” on a society that all subjects are invested 
in, and penality is society’s “counter-war.”32 With “society” as the abstract victim of the 
offense, the reformers’ beliefs about what made good laws led them to formulate 
deterrence, rather than sovereign revenge, as the moral basis for punishment.33 
Deterrence appears because society can only be injured in its interests but retains a 
righteous power to defend those interests and the juridical and penal systems are 
granted privilege to do so. 
The second exchange made punishment (or its threat) the basis for social order. The 
reversal of the “temporal direction of punishment,”34 from restoring a past state to 
protecting a current state of order from future disobedience, also inverted the analytic 
priority of order and punishment. The reformers proposed a series of public 
punishments that were to act as “semio-techniques,”35 as public lessons, linking crime 
and punishment for observers. If every crime is a wrong against both its concrete victim 
but also, abstractly, a wrong against all, then in the production of the criminal as “social 
enemy”36 everyday subjects should hear an implicit appeal to identify with authority. 
Sedition would decline. By substituting abstract victims, the reformers naturalized the 
prevailing political authorities and the prevailing social order as a proper arrangement 
of “society.” As each punishment would “teach a lesson,”37 punitive power would 
ground the social order. The reformers thus solidified a rising bourgeois ideal of social 
order against both monarchical power and lower-class illegalisms, substituted an ideal 
                                                 
30 Discipline & Punish, 79. 
31 Discipline & Punish, 75–79. 
32 Punitive Society, 33. 
33 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 53–54. 
34 Discipline & Punish, 126. 
35 Discipline & Punish, 94; 103; 255. 
36 Punitive Society, 44. More generally, see the 10 January 1973, 17 January 1973, and 24 January 1973 
lectures. 
37 Discipline & Punish, 113. 
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of consistency for that of justice, and legitimated a “power to punish…distributed in 
homogeneous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a continuous way, down to 
the finest grain of the social body.”38 
Foucault describes the reformers’ historical moment, the point of inflection between 
sovereignty and disciplinarity, with a question: “punitive city or coercive institution?”39 
The question concerns either state control and public punishment, or dispersed coercive 
correction and private punishment. Yet the reformers failed to foresee that social control 
would move outside the juridical system, and then outside the formal state. They had 
thought of punishment as within the ambit of state power, rather than a form of power 
with polyvalent application and dissociable from penality.40 Punishment leapt outside of 
the formal state to all sort of other institutions, some tenuously connected to political 
power—such as schools and asylums—and others outside the formal state yet sustained 
by exchanges of state power—such as factories and hospitals. The leap undermined their 
project.41 Disciplinary institutions multiplied. Under the “whole network of nonjudicial 
power” within disciplinary institutions, punishment became invested in procedures to 
condition subjects’ habitual obedience, evaluated on visible behaviors “at the level of the 
behavioral potentialities they represented.”42 In other words, disciplinary power came to 
reproduce itself through norms derived through institutional observation and enforced 
by punishments.43  
Foucault’s analysis contains several suggestions for an analysis of punishment. First, 
punishment appears as an object of contestation but also, when actualized, to be allied 
with authority rather than working against it. Greek, German, feudal, and monarchical 
punishments all occur on behalf of authority and not against authority. Second, popular 
punishments recapture authority to deploy it on behalf of another group. The reformers’ 
project to ally “society” against offenders worked against the power of the sovereign but 
without dissolving the authority to punish. Third, conceptions of punishment and 
punitive power are reciprocal. The reformers’ ideal of the “punitive city” and the 
disciplinary institution serve as models and as concrete practices through which power 
can be actualized. Discipline multiplies institutions of government and privatizes them 
in “establishments [that] take the State structure as their model: they are all little States 
that are made to function inside the State.”44 While the coercive institution—the 
disciplinary institution—comes to a place of prominence in Foucault’s historical account, 
it does not exhaust either power or punishment. The next two sections consider, first, the 
operations of punitive power and, second, how the supervention of the coercive 
institution may not render the punitive city outmoded. 
                                                 
38 Discipline & Punish, 80. 
39 Discipline & Punish, 129. 
40 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 82–83. 
41 Punitive Society, 209; “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 79; Discipline & Punish, 211ff. 
42 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 57. 
43 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 79; Punitive Society, 213–215. 
44 Punitive Society, 209. 
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WHAT IS IT TO PUNISH? THE ELEMENTS OF PUNISHMENT 
Foucault's engagements with punishment occur alongside a rising priority of genealogy 
in his thought and method. By contrast with Foucault’s archaeological approach to track 
the discursive bounds and thereby conceptual possibilities within a place and time, his 
genealogical method locates the force relations by which discourses, institutional forms, 
procedures, and technologies of power come into being and are stabilized. In many 
ways, Foucault’s work on punishment formalizes and refines Nietzsche's unsystematic 
provocations on its uses and force-relations, to produce, in Garland’s words, “a kind of 
penological rendering of Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals.”45 For Nietzsche “the concept 
‘punishment’ presents...not just one meaning but a whole synthesis of ‘meanings’”46 that 
defy any attempt at unity. Punishment takes many of the tactical forms that Foucault 
studies—the repayment of debt, the punishment as settlement to end cycles of 
vengeance, the punishment as war against “an enemy of peace, law, order, [and] 
authority”47—while it remains “absolutely undefinable.”48 For Foucault, by contrast, 
“the concept ‘punishment’” is too limited an approach. “Punishment” denotes a state of 
affairs and is thereby descriptive, but punishment is also a strategic field of—but not 
limited to—discourse and discourse’s perlocutionary effects, as well as a technology of 
power through which an order is created, retained, repaired, or extended in new form. 
The problem of punishment lies not in its meanings but its operations as a strategic field 
and the strategic use of penal institutions.  
A persistent critique of Foucault from criminology and the sociology of punishment 
has held that Foucault “presents the utopian ideals of the 18th-century reformers…as 
though they were actual reforms of the 18th and 19th centuries.”49 Yet the Punitive Society 
lectures make clear that Foucault’s interest as a “genealogist” lies in the disjuncture 
between proposal and adaptation, indeed how the prison-form can only be derived with 
a moralized notion of religious repentance.50 His impelling question is the strategic use 
afforded by a penal institution. A minimal problematic of punishment remains 
necessary to such an account. This section draws out the points of convergence in 
Foucault’s accounts of punishment to analyze punitive power’s operations and 
capacities. I argue that, for Foucault, punishment describes authority’s corporeal 
appropriation of an offender, a narration that the offense is the cause of the punishment, 
and a leveraging of that causal story to subordinate. I close by considering Foucault’s 
distinction between the punitive, which concerns the operations of punishment, and the 
penal, which concerns sanctioning. The critical point is that punishment need not be 
                                                 
45 Punishment and Modern Society, 168. 
46 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality [1887] (2006), 53. 
47 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 54. 
48 On the Genealogy of Morality, 53. 
49 C. Fred Alford, “What Would It Matter If Everything Foucault Said about Prison Were Wrong?,” Theory 
and Society 29:1, 134. Near-identical critiques are found in, e.g., Punishment and Modern Society; and Loïc 
Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (2009). 
50 21 February 1973 lecture, Punitive Society; Bernard E. Harcourt, “The ’73 Graft: Punishment, Political 
Economy, and the Genealogy of Morals” (2015). 
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carried out through state or carceral means—indeed, to think punishment only through 
a modern state evacuates historically contingent formations of punitive power that 
Foucault sought to analyze. 
Punishment is neither a trans-historical category nor a process necessary to the social, 
but rather a series of relations partially and temporarily unified by its exterior. 
Following Paul Patton’s observation that Foucault operates through an Aristotelian 
armature of multiple levels of causal explanation,51 there is no ultimate “source” of 
punishment but rather a set of conditions necessary to punishing. First, authority52 
serves as the “crucial emergent field”53 for any sort of punishing to arise. Those who 
punish include family patriarchs54; the heads or “spiritual directors” of Benedictine 
monasteries55; factory owners and foremen56; doctors57; King Louis XV and his agents58; 
“society,” in the reformers’ ideal organization59; and distributed actors who appropriate 
statistical methods of biopolitical regimes to set desired norms that differ from observed 
norms.60 All are invested with authority, yet few are state agents. Authority is wielded 
over subjects through punishment across both practical and theoretical distinctions 
internal to forms of power, such as public-private and state-society. Conversely, the 
subject of punishment is “the correlate of [a] governmental power”61 yet which is not 
state authority. Foucauldian punishment requires a subject attached to authority whom 
authority attempts to correct. Consequently, punishment constitutes a binding of the 
subject to power in a form where that power is constituted through sociality. If such a 
power is the state under disciplinary and sovereign governance in recent centuries, then 
it is not that punishment requires a state but instead that the state is the dominant 
structure of the authority-individual relation in the context of the analysis.  
Second, punishment refers to an operation of power that invariably involves power 
seizing a subject’s body,62 to differing intensities. Foucault makes this point early in 
Discipline and Punish:  
                                                 
51 Paul Patton, “Power and Biopower in Foucault,” in Biopower: Foucault and Beyond, ed. Vernon Cisney and 
Nicolae Morar (2016), 102–117. 
52 “Authority” is Foucault’s own term in Punitive Society, 208. 
53 Bob Jessop, “From Micro-Powers to Governmentality: Foucault’s Work on Statehood, State Formation, 
Statecraft, and State Power,” Political Geography 27 (2006), 34–40. 
54 Psychiatric Power, 80; see also Chloë Taylor, “Foucault and Familial Power,” Hypatia 27: 1 (2012), 201–218. 
55 Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, 172ff. 
56 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 83. 
57 Psychiatric Power, 10–12. 
58 Discipline & Punish. 
59 Punitive Society, 72. 
60 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics; see also Gilles Chantraine, “The Post-Disciplinary Prison,” in Discipline, 
Security, and beyond: Rethinking Foucault’s 1978 & 1979 College de France Lectures, ed. Bernard E. Harcourt 
(2008), 55–76. 
61 David Newheiser, “Foucault, Gary Becker and the Critique of Neoliberalism,” Theory, Culture & Society 
33:5 (2016), 13. 
62 See the discussion on the body in Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism 
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But we can surely accept the general proposition that, in our societies, the systems of 
punishment are to be situated in a certain ‘political economy’ of the body: even if they 
do not make use of violent or bloody punishment, even when they use ‘lenient’ 
methods involving confinement or correction, it is always the body that is at issue—
the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their 
submission.63  
He offers at least two registers in which power seizes the body. At one level lie the 
material forces of punishment. Foucault’s Punitive Society discussion offers exclusion, 
redemption, marking, and imprisonment as the “major forms of punitive tactics.”64 To 
exile or deport is to cast out the body, to deprive it of its means of survival and 
sustenance. Redemption burdens the body with obligations; it often coerces labor and 
other forms of physical compliance, either as condition of the sanction or as the 
mechanism by which amends can be made. Marking, scarification, amputations and 
branding all seize the body of the criminal to alter its physical form. Imprisonment is the 
body’s forcible or obligatory sequestration. At another level, punitive power would 
always seem to invest a “political economy” in the body that exceeds the individual as 
well as the offender-authority dyad. The operations of disciplinary institutions require 
that the body be passed over to power such that the subject can be reconstituted or 
differently constituted. So too the supplice or torture, famously exemplified in Damiens, 
concerns the economy of power made manifest in suffering. The point here is that a 
penalty and a punishment may be leveled on a body, yet the body does not act as a limit 
for punishment’s spatial operations. Rather, punishment leverages the body’s triple 
character as the surface of inscription on which representations can be “read,” as the 
target which must be made to conform to a multiplicity in its actions, and as the material 
through which intensities of experience are lived.65  
Third, methods of subordination through punishment are not uniform across 
modalities of power, nor historically. A major implicit contrast concerns the subject of 
punishment, the subject under punishment, and the offender’s relation to a multiplicity. 
For the pastoral power of the early monastics, punishment served as restorative 
practice—“penance was a medicine”66—while simultaneously returning the subject to 
the pious multiplicity that could only achieve salvation together. Where the sovereign 
power descends to punish—to lay claim to, to manifest its power on—it does so 
devolving power to judges, intendants, executioners, and so forth, claiming power in the 
symbols of divine right and in the figure of the sovereign person. Foucault claims that, 
although it did individuate bodies of offenders at strategic moments, 
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you can see that the relationship of sovereignty is a relationship in which the subject 
element is not so much, and we can even say it is almost never, an individual, an 
individual body. The relationship of sovereignty applies not to a somatic singularity 
but to multiplicities—like families, users—which in a way are situated above physical 
individuality, or, on the contrary, it applies to fragments or aspects of individuality, of 
somatic singularity.67 
Individual punishment serves to order multiplicities, which are the “subject-function” in 
the political technology of sovereignty. Punishment passes from the one to the 
multiplicity. By contrast, punishment under discipline marks out not the collective but 
the individual-qua-subject. Disciplinarity tends to refuse multiplicities as sites of 
intervention, because its “subject-function is fitted exactly on the somatic singularity: the 
subject-function of disciplinary power is applied and brought to bear on the body, on its 
actions, place, movements, strength, the moments of its life, and its discourses, on all of 
this.”68 Punishment performs a joining function in discipline, coercing conformity to a 
norm.  
Analogizing to Foucault’s analysis of the concrete and abstract victims of criminal 
offenses may be generative to understanding the join. Consider punishment’s abstract 
target. In the economies of power of sovereignty, the penal reformers, and the pastoral 
monastics, the offense separates the wayward offender from the multiplicity. 
Punishment restores the social order or state of grace through reincorporation. Under 
discipline (and, it would appear, biopower) the norm is the join by which the subject’s 
relation to a collectivity is understood and corrected. The individual is given, and 
separate; punishment integrates him or her. However, punishment requires another 
integration, in which the elements “below” the individual are incorporated into a subject 
or subjects. Recalling Damiens a final time, the geography of power with which the 
King’s agents could punish him was limited, on the one hand, “below” Damiens to the 
aspects of felt experience that could make him suffer, the intensities of pain he could be 
made to feel, but also the sympathetic experience of those who might observe the 
torture; and on the other, “above,” to coding Damiens as part of a collective subject of 
“the people” and in opposition to the sovereign. The abstract target was the relation of 
Damien’s body, its forces, and his affects to Damiens-as-subject; and Damiens-as-subject 
to the multiplicity to which he was ascribed. Likewise, if Foucault’s statement that “the 
other side of the disciplinary relationship is punishment”69 would introduce a problem, 
we might dissolve it by recognizing that the power to punish allows modalities of power 
to pass across bodies’ “fragmentary” pre- or non-individuated forms to singular 
individuals. To the extent that punitive pressure functions as the inverse or reciprocal 
form of discipline, disciplinarity uses punishment to shape a subject who will maintain 
the social order all on his or her own. 
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Fourth, punishment offers a narrative—a story about reasons for the penalty, if not a 
justification—both to the present and retrojected into the past. The “semio-technique” of 
punishment creates a motivated semiotic relation between the offender and a cause,70 
one easily blurred into political technique of punishment that presumes the rightfulness 
of rectifying violations of the social order. For example, Foucault says: 
when a so-called exemplary punishment was imposed on an action, even and above 
all when the action was apparently of little importance or consequence, it was in fact 
precisely with the aim of having a corrective effect, if not on the culprit himself—
because he was hardly corrected if he was hung. On the other hand, the correction, the 
corrective effect was clearly addressed to the rest of the population. To that extent, the 
practice of public torture and execution as an example was a corrective and 
disciplinary technique.71 
Foucault’s discussion uses sovereign punishment, which in its reconstitution of 
sovereign authority embeds an offense-response story. No “corrective” is available 
without such a link between behavior and penalty. Moreover, some collectivity must 
accept the offense-response story as meaningful, although parts of that story can be 
veiled. If a disciplinary function is to operate within sovereign power, the audience must 
juxtapose itself against the penalized offender but also, in the individuals who comprise 
the audience, identify with the offender, that is, self-identify as penalizable.  
While sovereignty directs this causal story to a subordinated “population, “with 
discipline the causal story is duplicated. Within disciplinary institutions, behaviors 
create records, records invoke diagnoses, and diagnoses implicate treatments as the 
basis for correcting “mis”behaviors. Mitchell Dean writes that in the period when the 
disciplines came to prominence, “The object of the whole penal ritual… is not only the 
crime but also the circumstances, instincts, passions, desires, effects of environment or 
heredity, of the criminal manifest in the crime.”72 Something in the offender’s conduct or 
being—milieu, character, or upbringing, but also behaviors, opinions, membership or 
identity—had led to the scene of punishment. Discipline uses written records to discover 
these “instincts, passions, desires…manifest in the crime.” On the one hand, discipline 
imitates sovereignty to make an audience of the collected subjects whose comportment 
and habits are to be trained. On the other hand, the records make an audience of the 
diagnostician, who elects proper courses of treatment. “Mis”behaviors should not imply 
agency or causal responsibility, although they tend to blur: in Foucault’s example of the 
prison, the advance that enables imprisonment to supersede other penal tactics is the 
insertion of moral desserts73 via notions of wrongdoing for which an offender may not 
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be morally responsible yet for which the offender is the final cause and thereby 
punishable.74 
I close this section by returning to Foucault’s criminological interlocutors. If punitive 
and penal phenomena such as the prison correlate only contingently, following Foucault 
through the punitive-penal distinction may help to clear up lingering confusion in 
commentators such as Loïc Wacquant. I use Wacquant here because his work 
exemplifies a pair of prevailing assumptions about Foucault’s work on punishment. For 
Wacquant:  
While its originary medium resides in the application of legal coercion to enforce the 
core strictures of the sociomoral order, punishment must be viewed not through the 
narrow and technical prism of repression but by recourse to the notion of production. 
The assertive rolling out of the penal state has indeed engendered new categories and 
discourses, novel administrative bodies and government policies, fresh social types 
and associated forms of knowledge across the criminal and social welfare domains.75  
While Wacquant has critiqued Foucault—more on that below—here I want to situate the 
impasse between Wacquant and Foucault at, first, the level of the penal-punitive 
distinction. Wacquant consistently conflates the punitive and the penal, which the subtle 
switch in the first and second sentences above exemplifies. Certainly the “penal state” 
has effected many changes along the lines that Wacquant asserts. But contemporary 
carceral power is only one instance of penal power. In the Foucauldian idiom, the penal 
concerns sanctioning—who gets sanctioned, for what, via what mechanisms, and 
through what channels—and punitive concerns punishment—how offense and penalty 
are linked, what penalties may do when employed, and the system of punishment in 
which a penalty is grounded.  
A penal-punitive distinction destabilizes the presumption of continuity between a 
sanction and the punishment that it mandates, but even further, enables an analysis of 
how punishment operates apart from and in excess of the legal domain. In the Punitive 
Society lectures, Foucault claims that in the unified “tactic” of discipline at the moment 
of its consolidation 
We have therefore two ensembles: The penal ensemble, characterized by the 
prohibition and the sanction, the law; and the punitive ensemble, characterized by the 
coercive penitentiary system. The first ensemble brings with it a certain theory of the 
infraction as an act of hostility towards society; the second brings with it the practice 
of confinement.76 
Both punishment and penality have their most intense effects outside of court, on 
subjects who are never accused, who may never be prosecutable despite legally 
noncompliant conduct. However, punishment has no necessary relation to Wacquant’s 
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“application of legal coercion.” For Foucault, relations of force within society determine 
but never permanently settle the boundaries that distinguish the illegal and the offense 
from injurious behaviors that fail to merit punishing and from tolerated noncompliant 
behaviors.77 The penal operates both “inside” the law and in the distribution of 
“illegalisms,” just as the punitive does. Yet one cannot analyze punishment by analyzing 
the penal sanction. Instead, the punitive and the penal might be understood as mutually 
inscribed functions, one for creating difference and another for selecting, extending, 
intensifying difference.  
The second disjuncture occurs at the level of the subject. Wacquant’s most persistent 
critique charges that Foucault could not account for differentiation in punishment, that 
Foucault “overlooked both the steep selectivity of penalization and the enduring 
centrality of punishment to the symbolic projection and material exercise of state 
power.”78 However, punishment is not just aimed at correcting the relation of an 
individual to an amorphic multiplicity, but to the specific social group; it is precisely a 
tool of individuation and differentiation. Wacquant has his own set of critics, who 
criticize his functionalism and unidirectional flow of power from “bureaucratic field” to 
subject, his reading of the bureaucratic field as a penal actor rather than an effect of 
governance, his lack of sensitivity to difference across sites, and his reading practices 
generally.79 Complementarily with these critiques, I want to suggest the presence of a 
real impasse between Wacquant and Foucault at the level of the subject. Wacquant’s use 
of the “bureaucratic field” presupposes strategic agents with interests, goals, desires, 
and wills. Subjects predicate the field. For Foucault, in fact, none of that is clear; instead, 
subjects are constituted by power relations as much as they may bring power into play. 
Subjects cannot be assumed, as Wacquant does. Thereby Foucault can hold that 
difference is created in prison—punitive power materialized—after it had been 
extended in a sanction. At one level, the creation and perfection of subjects is an ongoing 
process in disciplinarity’s “perfect continuity of the punitive and the penal.”80 At 
another level, punitive power operates outside the prison, the penal system, and the 
state as a matter of its very function. 
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THE PUNITIVE CITY AS TECHNOLOGY AND DIAGRAM 
The 18th century reformers’ theories responded to observed limitations internal to 
sovereign power’s capacity to punish. Their proposal—the “punitive city”—was 
superseded almost immediately by the development of the disciplines. Yet it is worth 
dwelling on. In this section, I present a dual reading of the “punitive city,” first as 
fantasy-abstraction of the reformers, then as a diagram of power. Positing the punitive 
city as a diagram deepens the account of how punitive power is exercised at the joins of 
fragment-individual and individual-multiplicity, and proposes to link punishment and 
deterrence more robustly. Up to this point I have used Foucault to authorize a reading of 
Foucault; now I use Foucault to authorize a critique of Foucault, specifically the 
dichotomy of “punitive city or coercive institution” and the disciplinary replacement of 
punitive power. Two critiques ground the argument. First, I consider how disciplinarity 
operates by channeling or appropriating other technologies of power within its 
institutions, and point to how the punitive city diagram can serve as its exterior 
condition. Second, I argue that Foucault’s preoccupation with bounded spatial 
assemblages proposes an unnecessary conflict between disciplinary institution and the 
punitive city, which does not operate as a spatial enclosure. Immediately, however, I 
describe Foucault’s account of the genesis and key features of the punitive city. 
The limits that judges and juries placed on the penal sanction taught the reformers 
several important lessons. One was the necessity of attending to prevailing moral beliefs 
among those subject to the law and those charged with adjudicating it. They noted that 
when the law mandated sentences that were too severe or too lenient, judges and 
magistrates often evaded or deliberately misapplied the law.81 A second lesson was the 
impracticality of combatting the prevalence of a given offence with a drastic increase in 
the severity of its sanction. Adjudicators had resisted oversevere penalties with 
behaviors such as “pious perjury,” in which they could “avoid applying the penalty by 
disqualifying the crime”—that is, finding “facts” to undervalue or underdescribe sizes, 
distances, amounts, or quantities so as not to apply mandated but unjust sentences.82 
This signaled that disproportionate punishments amplified resistance to the law. A third 
lesson was the danger inhering in an economy of power that overinvested in local 
administration. Powers of particularist application created opportunities for subversion 
and disorder. In response, the reformers sought “to insert the power to punish more 
deeply into the social body”83—in other words to eliminate the relays between sovereign 
command and penalty, to the greatest extent possible. They revised the aim of 
adjudication, from justice—a particularistic concern—to that of fairness—a general 
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concern about consistency of procedure. At the same time, the reformers minimized the 
role of the individual uptake in juridical procedures: what is most important is that the 
mass of individuals recognize that they are subject to a punitive power, rather than their 
testifying to its moral legitimacy. 
The possibility of power’s failure or, worse yet, its diversion led the reformers to 
propose several disjunct objectives for their technology of power. Foucault terms these 
“rules.” The “rule of minimum quantity” mandates that material “disadvantage” of 
punishment must exceed the material “advantage” to the crime. Moreover, the 
representation of the material disadvantage must be sufficient to prevent future 
offenses. The “rule of sufficient ideality” specifies that punishment must be displayed or 
known to be preventative, and that it had to be known with an adequate intensity of 
psychical pain. Conceiving of the punishment had to give “displeasure” per se. 
Deterrence is formulated in Foucault's “rule of lateral effects”: “The penalty must have 
its most intense effects on those who have not committed the crime.”84 The “rule of 
perfect certainty” posits that each crime have a clear penalty, that the catalog of crimes 
be known to all in the form of laws, and that each crime must be punished. What 
defined each crime would be certain, its penalty would be certain, and it was to be 
certain that the crime would be penalized. The “rule of common truth” mandates that 
guilt or innocence be determined only through the idea of proofs and measures of 
evidence, and that the state banish lingering feudal forms of the test. With this latter 
pair, the reformers related two problematics: the first, of maximizing the social 
enforcement of obedience to the law, through the public proclamation of laws—to 
generate a subjective investment in the law—and the second, of deterrence, which 
presupposes an epistemological relation between offense and punishment. Finally, the 
rules must allow for a contingency function, such that “silence of the law must not 
harbour the hope of impunity” for wrong behavior.85 Nor may subjects find impunity 
within the law, since “the rich do not fear fines nor the notorious infamy.”86 To 
effectively hold social control, an individualization of the sentence to offender is needed, 
which Foucault terms the “rule of optimal specification.” 
The reformers’ problematic culminated in the fantasy-abstraction of the punitive city. 
Foucault allegorizes a nearly unbroken extensity of “hundreds of tiny theaters of 
punishment”:  
This, then, is how one must imagine the punitive city. At the crossroads, in the 
gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges built, in workshops open to all, 
in the depths of mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of tiny theatres of 
punishment. Each crime will have its law; each criminal his punishment. It will be a 
visible punishment, a punishment that tells all, that explains, justifies itself, convicts: 
placards, different-coloured caps bearing inscriptions, posters, symbols, texts read or 
printed, tirelessly repeat the code…But the essential point, in all these real or 
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magnified severities, is that they should all, according to a strict economy, teach a 
lesson: that each punishment should be a fable.87 
The punitive city is doubly teleological. At one level, the public display of punishments 
educates the population, presenting object-lessons that would testify to the 
consequences of violating the social order. By locating punishments in “hundreds of tiny 
theatres” across the city, the reformers could shape the urban order through 
representation and belief. Their punishments would both manifest and testify to “a 
functioning of penal power, distributed throughout the social space…[and] a power to 
punish that ran the whole length of the social network.”88 At another level, the punitive 
city exploits visibility and everyday movement. The “sights” of the punitive city turn as 
much on their commonality—dependably encountered, mundane, and held in 
common—as on the viewer’s acceptance of the punishment’s representational content. 
That is, the punitive city would expose and habituate its residents to the sights of 
punishment in order to “initiate” them as subjects through self-recognition and 
subjective identification. 
The representational stakes are indicated by Foucault's summation: punishments are 
to be “fables.” Fables, of course, have morals. Likewise, just as a fable has characteristic 
structural elements and narrative techniques, the punishments were to “shape the 
discourse that each individual has with others and by which crime is forbidden to all by 
all.”89 In this way, punishment in the punitive city reiterates Foucault’s earlier discussion 
of fable in an essay on Jules Verne.90 A fable, he says, has a “content,” a form of “public 
discourse” in how it is recounted, and a “speaking subject.” The reformers’ analogical 
system of penalties, in which “each crime will have its law,”91 conforms to the 
“fabulous” order: “The punishment must proceed from the crime”—the content—“the 
law must appear to be a necessity of things”—the form of discourse—“and power must 
act while concealing itself beneath the gentle force of nature” as “speaking subject.”92 
Above each recounting, the united author-authority of the punishment remains. 
However, the punitive city is also a governing ideal, and must attend to its political 
subjects who comprise an audience. The penalty might falter as punishment if irregular 
and arbitrary penality establishes not an offense-penalty causal story but rather, at best, 
a link between the penalty and being caught. Further, the punishment-fable must 
generate a reflexive understanding on the part of the audience while it sustains 
authority's position as arbiter of interpretation. 
Through sight, movement, and material penalties the punitive city makes appear an 
asymmetric opposition of authority and individual offender. The punitive city 
orchestrates visibility. In this way it may be read diagrammatically, relating a set of non-
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discursive formations to a set of discursive formations. Foucault’s most famous diagram, 
the panopticon, presents “a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form; its 
functioning, abstracted from any obstacle, resistance or friction, must be represented as a 
pure architectural and optical system: it is in fact a figure of political technology that 
may and must be detached from any specific use.”93 In an echo of Foucault’s distinction 
between “content” and “public discourse,” Deleuze describes the panopticon to make a 
“correspondence” or “coadaptation” between, first, a discursive form of penal law 
whose content concerns criminals and whose public discourse concerns the purposes 
and procedures of confinement, and, second, a non-discursive formation with a content 
of the concrete structure and its “form” and function “to see without being seen.”94 
Following Deleuze’s analysis of Foucault, the diagram is two irreducible formations that 
rely upon “a mutual presupposition operating between” them, a novel function 
immanently caused through the intermingling of incongruous functions.95  
The punitive-city diagram might be said to map points through which punitive 
power passes, without determining the use or outcome of that immanent organization.96 
The punitive city links residents’ unwilled “‘pain’ of the idea of ‘pain’” to the forced 
visibility of offenders97; each of these has a correspondence between representational 
and non-representational elements (an idea of pain to a feeling of “displeasure”; an 
identification of the scene to one's passing through it). The correspondences might be 
said to join fragments to individuals as much as, on a different level, the technology of 
the punitive city joins individuals to multiplicities. As a diagram, the punitive city is 
closely related to the panopticon: both rely on visibility and representation to, as 
Deleuze says, “impose a particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity.”98 They 
correspond in penality, in the “system of language that classifies and translates offences 
and calculates sentences.”99 But where the multiplicity of discipline “is reduced and 
confined to a tight space,” the punitive city’s form utilizes not confinement but motion, 
not “seeing without being seen” but a dependable experience of “seeing another 
punished.” Deleuze notes that “Form here can have two meanings: it forms or organizes 
matter; or it forms or finalizes functions and gives them aims,” and defines the panoptic 
diagram’s material organization as the prison itself, which restricts movements, and its 
function as punishment.100 In the punitive city, the formal matter is the built 
environment, allowing for circulations and movements, and the formalized function is 
deterrence. The punitive city expands rather than segments; it habituates with 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 205. 
94 Deleuze, Foucault, 32–33, 47ff. The four-part form is Deleuze’s appropriation of Louis Hjelmslev’s 
semiotic theory of the sign-function, which uses the terminology “content,” “expression,” “form,” and 
“substance.” Deleuze considers two dyads: content-form/content-substance and expression-
form/expression-substance. I thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.  
95 Foucault, 33–34; Jakub Zdebik, Deleuze and the Diagram: Aesthetic Threads in Visual Organization (2013). 
96 Cf. Foucault, Discipline & Punish, 205-206. 
97 Discipline & Punish, 94. 
98 Foucault, 34. 
99 Ibid., 32. 
100 Ibid., 33. 
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representations rather than instruments of training; it deters with the goal of freezing a 
social world that is ever-moving. It couches a dream of stasis within itself.   
Considering the punitive city as a diagram enables a revision to Foucault’s thought. 
The punitive city and coercive or disciplinary institution may be functionally 
complementary, spatially non-exclusive, and may mutually articulate in a strategic 
practice that subordinates individuals and collectivities. This argument is, in a way, a 
Foucauldian one. In the Security, Territory, Population lectures, Foucault held that the 
major technologies of power in the Global North—sovereign power, discipline, 
biopower—form a “solid series”101 rather than a supplantation, a symbiosis rather than 
succession. If so, their correlative diagrams might also operate in concert. To begin, how 
do we account for authority in punishment within the disciplinary institution, both in 
the forms of power that the disciplinary institution wields to make bodies docile, and in 
that which guarantees the exercise of disciplinary authority? In the “Truth and Juridical 
Forms” lectures, disciplinary power operates by coupling an economic power—in the 
form of exchange or production—to a political power—such as the rights to expel, 
differentiate, or impose rules—and, further, to a judicial power that renders decisions 
about punishment and reward.102 However, the institutional cooptation of non-
disciplinary power to operate mechanically within a disciplinary strategy cannot 
guarantee the institution’s continual operation or reproduction. A fully self-contained 
institution is vulnerable to cooptation or takeover by the very individuals it operates to 
make docile; as Foucault says in the Punitive Society lectures, “the workshop could not 
function in the structure of the convent or the barracks if there were not the police or the 
army alongside.”103 In other words, disciplinary institutions require a form of power 
exterior to them and yet made to operate within the same function.104 At issue, then, is 
whether and the extent to which the sights of the punitive city could serve as the 
disciplinary institution's exterior function. This question inverts the reformers’ problem: 
where sovereignty’s general discontinuity made it ineffective as a guarantor of the social 
order within the territory – according to the reformers – the disciplinary institution has 
effective continuity of power within but only on the condition of a power without. 
Foucault offers a spatial juxtaposition between the punitive city and coercive 
institution. The punitive city is extensive, with punitive power “distributed throughout 
the social space” by means of spectacle yet within an urban site. By contrast, Foucault 
says that “the first action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a space in which its 
power and the mechanisms of its power will function fully and without limit.”105 The 
coercive institution segments, confines, and then imposes a conduct. Despite the 
apparent contrast, both metaphors presuppose a space that is divided, more or less 
clearly, with a discrete inside juxtaposed to an unformed outside. The tendency to think 
of spatial relations as the occurrence of discrete objects that have interiors (and 
                                                 
101 Security, Territory, Population, 108. 
102 “Truth and Juridical Forms,” 83; see also Punitive Society, 214–215. 
103 Punitive Society, 209. 
104 Foucault, 43. 
105 Security, Territory, Population, 45; see also Discipline & Punish, 130–131. 
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consequently, which might be fractured) and exteriors or limits is typical of Foucault’s 
writing.106 The list compiled by the French geographers who interviewed him for the 
journal Hérodote describes a “profuse use of spatial metaphors – position, displacement, 
site, field; sometimes geographical metaphors even – territory, domain, soil, horizon, 
archipelago, geopolitics, region, landscape.”107 Similarly, in the 1964 essay “The 
Language of Space,” Foucault gives “the gap, distance, the intermediary, dispersion, 
fracture and difference” as spatial metaphors.108 One sees a preponderance of distance-
delineated relations in bounded space. Yet analogizing the reformers’ ideal to practices 
within urban space risks circumscribing the operation of deterrent power to a territorial 
form. The diagram of the punitive city does not hinge on an architectural form 
analogous to how “stones can make people docile and knowable”109 in the diagram of 
the panopticon. Rather, the spatial proposition of the punitive city disperses the sights of 
punitive power, giving merely the appearance that the punishing authority’s power is 
spatially continuous. In contrast to a sovereign power that attempts and fails to blanket 
and saturate public space, the spatial model for the power proposed by the reformers is, 
on the one hand, a temporal irregularity in a regular spatial form, such that its location 
is constantly varying, like a sound wave or ripples when throwing rocks on a lake; and, 
on the other hand, described by a shape or topology that never exists except in 
representation of its predictable effects, such as an orbit or gravity. The use of violence 
and spectacle in the punitive city does not and cannot displace the coercive institution 
spatially because they are not mutually exclusive productions of spatial interiority by 
power and they do not produce space in substantially identical ways. 
The problem that the punitive city attempts to solve is a functional equivalence of 
forces. The reformers were limited by an inability to secure compliance continually and 
uniformly across space, as biopolitical modes are similarly limited today. The punitive 
city’s orchestration of visibility is meant to deter, to “indefinitely postpone”110 any actual 
combat between forces on the idea that, as Foucault paraphrases Hobbes, either the 
stronger would brutally subdue the weaker or “relationship of force would remain 
virtual, precisely because the weak are timorous.”111 My own objective in this section has 
been to locate the punitive city as a diagram of power, one that might serve as a “tool” 
or a “‘gadget’ of approach or methodology.”112 One can both accept some or all of 
                                                 
106 In addition to the below, see the terms cited by Peter Johnson, “Foucault’s Spatial Combat,” Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 26:4 (2008), 612–613; and Jeremy W. Crampton, “Space, Territory, 
Geography,” in A Companion to Foucault, ed. Christopher Falzon, Timothy O’Leary, and Jana Sawicki 
(2013), 384–399. 
107 Michel Foucault, “Questions on Geography” [1976], in Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and 
Geography, ed. Jeremy W Crampton and Stuart Elden (2007), 176. 
108 Michel Foucault, “The Language of Space” [1964], in Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and Geography, 
ed. Jeremy W Crampton and Stuart Elden (2007), 163. 
109 Discipline & Punish, 172. 
110 William Bogard, “Discipline and Deterrence: Rethinking Foucault on the Question of Power in 
Contemporary Society,” The Social Science Journal 28:3 (1991), 341. 
111 Society Must Be Defended, 91. 
112 “Questions on Geography,” 174. 
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Foucault’s various claims about the transition to “disciplinary society” while contesting 
Foucault’s claim about the replacement of the punitive city by coercive institution. In a 
sovereign system, the punitive-city function gives the appearance of the sovereign will 
across space; in discipline, it models both an external deterrence against revolution 
within the workshop and an internal deterrence that would establish an individual's 
obedience to the rules of the school, factory, or prison. Such deterrence is the recourse 
for, as William Bogard writes, a paradoxical “inability to exercise power,” perhaps a 
tacit admission of authority’s weakness.113  
CONCLUSION: PUNISHMENT, DISCIPLINE, AND THE DIAGRAM OF 
DETERRENCE 
Foucault’s account of the punitive city and disciplinary institution as competing models 
invites a final reflection. Foucault’s claim the “the other side of the disciplinary 
relationship is punishment”114 invites at least four readings on the relationship of 
discipline and punishment. Discipline and punishment might comprise a single, double-
sided technology, as suggested by Foucault’s claim of sovereign punishment as a 
“corrective and disciplinary technique.”115 Alternatively, discipline and punishment 
might be necessarily complementary yet distinct. In yet another reading, discipline 
might inscribe punishment within itself, either as a technology or as a historical 
formation. I find this the strongest reading, and it has been that which I have used 
throughout this paper. But in a final reading, discipline and punishment might operate 
on the basis of a “mutual presupposition.” If “discipline is a mode of individualization 
of multiplicities,”116 and if disciplinary power requires each of the elements of punitive 
power to operate—authority, bodies, individual-collective and fragment-individual 
joins, and a causal story—then punitive power might condition disciplinary power’s 
field of intelligibility. The open question is whether disciplinary tactics are necessarily 
punitive or instead if disciplinary power rearranges the elements of punishment. I leave 
this question for future scholarship. But should punishment make discipline make 
sense, it would offer inroads to a second question, of the relation between punitive and 
disciplinary power considering Foucault’s unsaid but prepared remark regarding “the 
analysis of a form of power I have called punitive, which it would be better to call 
disciplinary.”117 
This paper has provided a minimal account of an analytics of punishment immanent 
in Foucault’s work. As an “analyzer of power,” punishment focalizes the power 
relations through which punitive practices and procedures arise, such as “pious 
multiplicity” of the early monastics and the sovereign economy of the body. As a 
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114 Psychiatric Power, 51. 
115 Security, Territory, Population, 7. 
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technology, punitive power seizes the body in the name of an authority or reified power, 
targeting the fragment-individual and individual-multiplicity joins, to subordinate 
individuals and/or multiplicities. As a diagram, the punitive city maps the use of 
punitive power to order the social, as well as the limitations in so doing. Readings of the 
spectacle, especially Debordian readings, generally present representation as a domain 
of state strength. My analysis here, particularly of the punitive-city diagram, would 
suggest that the state makes recourse to representation when it perceives that power 
differentials are not sufficiently extreme, when it cannot compel compliance to its will. 
This should not, however, imply an absence of power, but rather a deficit of the 
coordination necessary for sovereign governance.  
The 18th century reformers’118 influence may be traced in contemporary practices that 
include neoliberal penality, via “broken windows” policing and cost-benefit legal 
analyses119; migration governance that attempts to deter migration to the global north by 
increasing mortality120; and in the pervasive practice to identify subgroups as prone to 
wrong-doing, such as racialized tropes of criminality.121 Foucault repeatedly emphasizes 
that the reformers were targeting the working class, not their own bourgeois peers and 
certainly not all equally.122 He critiqued the punitive city as limited in use and reach, 
relying too much on the power of representation for its purposes. Yet if the punitive city 
serves as a diagram of deterrent power, then its activation might be widespread. 
Neoliberal penality, migration deterrence, and racialized criminality all employ a 
directed punitive power that blurs the distinction between innocent and “potentially 
guilty”123 and reinscribes subgroup difference. Foucault had imagined that the semiotic 
operation of punishment would be effective for subordination when crime faithfully 
implied punishment. This is not the only possibility. A different semiotic couple may 
take hold, as in the US, where blacks and whites use drugs at the same rates, and where 
whites are more likely to sell drugs, yet blacks are more likely to be arrested for drug 
offenses and more likely to be sent to prison when they are.124 The political rationality is 
that prisoners are incarcerated not because of selective effects but because of their legal 
guilt. This system is stable. It also indicates something about punishment and the 
punitive-city diagram: that the semiotics of punishment afford a political use when their 
                                                 
118 Birth of Biopolitics, 248ff.; Andrew Dilts, “Foucault Meets Gary Becker: Criminology beyond Discipline and 
Punish,” in Discipline, Security, and beyond: Rethinking Foucault’s 1978 & 1979 Collège de France Lectures, ed. 
Bernard E. Harcourt (2008), 77–100; Bernard E. Harcourt, “Neoliberal Penality: A Brief Genealogy,” 
Theoretical Criminology 14:1 (2010), 74–92.  
119 Dilts, “Foucault Meets Gary Becker”; Harcourt, “The ’73 Graft.” 
120 Vicki Squire, “Governing Migration through Death in Europe and the US: Identification, Burial and the 
Crisis of Modern Humanism,” European Journal of International Relations 23:3 (2017), 513-532. 
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“direction” is reversed, if a prisoner – and particularly a minoritized prisoner – 
faithfully implies a crime.125  
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